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Abstract
We develop a structural default model for interconnected financial institutions in a prob-
abilistic framework. For all possible network structures we characterize the joint default dis-
tribution of the system using Bayesian network methodologies. Particular emphasis is given
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1 Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis has unmistakably revealed on which fragile grounds the global finan-
cial system was built at that time. Contrary to the usual perception that diversification reduces
risk, it was precisely the interconnectedness of the system that made the spread of shocks across
large scales possible. Henceforth, a lot of effort has been put into understanding the origin, the
mechanisms and the consequences of financial contagion. It is still a matter of current research
to analyze the complex effects of financial interconnection and whether it is a blessing or a
curse for the stability of the overall financial system. For example, while the classical papers
by Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) argue that interconnection strengthens the
resilience of financial systems, recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2015) and Elliott et al. (2014)
demonstrate the robust-yet-fragile nature of financial systems: Densely connected systems can
prove to be more robust, but also to be more vulnerable to shocks, depending on the actual
network structure. Therefore, a profound understanding of interconnectedness and the risk of
financial contagion is inevitable for bankers, regulators and other decision makers in order to
set up effective detection and prevention mechanisms for possible future crises.
In the literature on balance sheet contagion, one of the most prominent default cascade
models is that of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). Under mild assumptions on the operative cash
flows the financial institutions generate, the authors use a fixed-point argument to establish the
existence of a unique clearing payment vector, which can be explicitly computed via a fictitious
default algorithm. Extending the model by introducing bankruptcy costs, Rogers and Veraart
(2013) show that the clearing vector is no longer uniquely determined in general. Instead, the
fictitious default algorithm can be modified to produce the greatest and the least clearing vector.
Although Eisenberg and Noe (2001) also discuss qualitative implications of stochastic operative
cash flows, the core analysis of these two papers remains deterministic.
Imposing maximal bankruptcy costs (i.e., creditors lose the total value of a claim upon default
of the counterparty), Gai and Kapadia (2010) show that the relationship between connectedness
and stability in financial systems exhibits a phase transition: Interconnection can both absorb
and amplify shocks. Analytical results, however, are only obtained on homogeneous random
graphs where exposures are evenly distributed among all counterparties. We refer to Hurd (2016)
for extensions and comparisons between the Eisenberg-Noe and the Gai-Kapadia model.
A nonmonotonic effect of interconnection on stability is also confirmed by Acemoglu et al.
(2015). Drawing on a variant of Eisenberg and Noe’s model, they show that for small shocks,
highly diversified systems are less susceptible to contagion than sparsely connected networks,
but that the opposite is true for big shocks. Methodologically, the authors impose a two-state
evolution for the firms and identify the optimal network for the small as well as the big shock
regime. Assuming that interconnection arises through asset cross-holdings rather than mutual
liabilities, Elliott et al. (2014) derive the same qualitative result on various random graph models.
Another interesting development of the Eisenberg-Noe model is carried out by Gourie´roux
et al. (2012). The authors first extend the existence and uniqueness of a clearing vector to the
situation where interfirm share holdings are included in the model. Additional to these (again
purely deterministic) considerations, they further discuss the consequences for the financial
system when random shocks occur, giving two quantitative results: First, they compute the
conditional distribution of the firm values when it is known which firms default and which not.
Second, they provide an enumeration type formula for the probability of default for a given firm
in the network. However, they do not reveal how the terms in their expansion (which are the
probabilities of joint default configurations) can be computed. Furthermore, it is unclear how
to determine which institutions default or not at first place because this in turn depends on the
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firm values. Finally, let us also mention Glasserman and Young (2015) who give quantitative
estimates on the probability of default in various contagion models.
In addition to the mainly theoretical contributions mentioned above, a lot of empirical work
has been carried out, see e.g. Elsinger et al. (2006), Cont et al. (2013), Craig and von Peter (2014)
and Langfield et al. (2014) for applications to central bank data from the Austrian, Brazilian,
German and UK banking system, respectively. Furthermore, apart from work based on varia-
tions of the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model, there are also other network-based approaches
to systemic risk. We refer to Castiglionesi and Eboli (2015) for the usage of flow network tech-
niques, to Fouque and Sun (2013), Kley et al. (2015) and Chong and Klu¨ppelberg (2017) for
models relying on stochastic differential equations, and to Amini et al. (2016) and Detering et al.
(2017) for contagion analyses on large random graphs. While the analysis in Castiglionesi and
Eboli (2015) is again deterministic, the other papers rely on probabilistic approaches that only
apply to stylized or limiting networks.
Even though some of the aforementioned works discuss stochastic effects in the context of
financial contagion, the full structure of the default probabilities within a given (not necessarily
stylized) financial system remains unknown when future returns are random. And this is exactly
the problem we want to address in the present paper. For all possible network structures of a
financial system subjected to stochastic shocks, we give a complete characterization of the joint
default probability distribution of the system, in a way that the probability of default for a single
or a group of institutions can be computed efficiently. Moreover, our analysis will also allow for
identifying possible channels of financial contagion and measuring the systemic importance of
institutions.
Our approach will draw upon methods from the theory of Bayesian networks, also known
as directed graphical models, see e.g. Lauritzen (1996) and Koller and Friedman (2009). These
models are a priori defined on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), but it is widely aknowledged that
mutual dependencies and directed cycles are omnipresent in financial systems. Therefore, for
the purposes of this paper, we have to extend the theory of Bayesian networks to graphs with
directed cycles, and we will do so by interpreting a cyclic model as the margin of an acyclic
model on a suitably enlarged graph. This methodology for treating cyclic graphical models or,
more generally, systems with feedback cycles, is of independent interest and may be useful for
other applications as well.
The remaining article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a probabilistic
structural default model for interconnected financial institutions. As in Gai and Kapadia (2010),
Rogers and Veraart (2013) and Elliott et al. (2014), our model takes bankruptcy costs into
account so that the standard balance sheet equations may no longer have a unique solution.
Apart from specific examples, a general characterization of uniqueness of solutions seems to be
absent in the literature. So this leads to our first main result, Theorem 2.4, which states that
uniqueness holds if and only if the underlying liability network corresponds to a DAG.
If the interfirm liabilities exhibit a DAG structure, we further prove in Section 3, Theorem 3.2,
that the default variables of the institutions form a Bayesian network on this DAG. In other
words, if we fix an institution i and assume knowledge about the state of all its debtors (its
parents in the language of graph theory), its default probability is independent of all other firms
that have not lent (directly or indirectly via other firms) to i (the non-descendants of i).
If there are directed lending cycles, which is most likely the case in practice, the previously
identified non-uniqueness problem requires further specification of the sets of defaulting and
surviving firms. For the two extremal cases, the mild and the strict default rule, we recover
in Theorems 3.10 and 3.12 the Bayesian network structure of the default variables on a suit-
ably enlarged liability graph. So for all financial networks—no matter with or without directed
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cycles—the joint default distribution of the system can be efficiently structured in terms of a
Bayesian network.
In Section 4 we discuss the practical consequences and advantages of having a Bayesian
network structure. We first reveal how to decide on a graphical basis whether the default of two
(or two groups of) firms is stochastically dependent or not. Second, we highlight in a numerical
study how established algorithms can be used to compute conditional or unconditional default
probabilities, either exactly or approximatively. Finally, we define and analyze two measures
of systemic risk that follow from our Bayesian network analysis. In contrast to many already
existing measures, ours are probabilistic in nature and follow from a structural default cascade
model. Section 5 concludes and points at further research directions.
2 Default risk model for interconnected firms
We consider N firms labeled i = 1, . . . , N within an economy for a single period. At time t = 0,
each firm i has some operating assets Xi and some cash Ki that yields a riskless continuous
interest at a rate of r0. The same firm also has some external liabilities Fi that are to be
redeemed at time t = T , the end of the period, with a continuous interest rate of r′0. In addition
to that, at t = 0, each firm i has lent firm j an amount of Lij (possibly 0) which is to be repaid
by j at time t = T with a continuous interest rate of rij . In other words, firm i holds a bond
of firm j with face value Lij and a single coupon payment at maturity T . Apart from that, no
other financial involvement exists between the N firms.
During the period from t = 0 to t = T every company i uses its operating assets Xi to
run a firm-specific business. Following the classical work of Merton (1974), this is assumed to
evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion with drift µi and volatility σ2i . The driving
Brownian motions B1, . . . , BN are considered to be independent. We shall comment on possible
relaxations of this assumption in Section 5.
In order to simplify the subsequent exposition, the values Ki, Fi and Lij are assumed to be
nonnegative, the asset drifts µi as well as the interest rates rij , r0 and r′0 may take positive or
negative values, and Xi, σi and T are strictly positive. Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N} we
suppose that
Ki < e(r
′
0−r0)TFi +
N∑
j=1
e(rji−r0)TLji. (2.1)
Firms that have more cash reserves than the bound on the right-hand side of (2.1) will never
experience default at time t = T . Even if they do not receive payments from the other institutions
and lose all their operating assets, they still have enough money to meet all their obligations.
Since we are interested in the default probabilities within the financial network, there is no loss
of generality if we exclude such institutions from our analysis.
Let us also point out that we take a “central bank” perspective in this paper. All parameters
and quantities introduced above are assumed to be known or have been estimated before. We
refer to Anand et al. (2015), Gandy and Veraart (2016) and Upper (2011) for various methods
to estimate interfirm exposures.
Based on the previously described set-up, the balance sheet of firm i at time t = 0 has the
form depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 1. In essence, the situation at time t = 0 is a
variant of the classical model by Eisenberg and Noe (2001). At the time of maturity, however,
ours differs in two important aspects from that of Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
First, the value of firm i’s operating assets at t = T , which is given by
Xi(T ) = Xie(µi−σ
2
i /2)t+σiBi(T ),
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Operating assets Liabilities
- external
Xi Fi
Loans - to other firms
N∑
j=1
Lij
N∑
j=1
Lji
Cash Equity
Ki Ei(0)
Assets at t = 0 Liabilities and equity
at t = 0
Operating assets Liabilities
- external
Xi(T ) er
′
0TFi
Loans - to other firms
N∑
j=1
erijTLij1S(j)
N∑
j=1
erjiTLji
Cash Equity
er0TKi Ei(T )
Assets at t = T Liabilities and equity
at t = T
Figure 1: Idealized balance sheet of firm i at t = 0 and t = T .
is random, whereas the operating cash flows in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) are assumed to be
deterministic.
Second, in contrast to a linear or proportional recovery, we impose a zero recovery rate in
the default scenario; that is, if a firm is not able to meet all of its obligations, none of its
creditors receives any payment. As Gai and Kapadia (2010) argue, “this assumption is likely to
be realisitic in the midst of a crisis: In the immediate aftermath of a default, the recovery rate
and the timing of recovery will be highly uncertain and banks’ funders are likely to assume the
worst-case scenario” (p. 2407). We also refer to Battiston et al. (2012) and Cont et al. (2013) for
a similar reasoning and Memmel et al. (2012) for empirical evidence for the frequent occurrence
of a recovery rate close to zero.
Standard balance sheet considerations lead us to the following definition (we do not distin-
guish between the terms bankruptcy, default and insolvency in this paper).
Definition 2.1 A company defaults (survives) at time t = T if it belongs to the set
D := {i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : Ei(T ) < 0}
(S := {i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : Ei(T ) ≥ 0}), (2.2)
where Ei(T ) is the equity of firm i at time T given by
Ei(T ) := Xi(T ) +
N∑
j=1
erijTLij1S(j) + er0TKi − er′0TFi −
N∑
j=1
erjiTLji. (2.3)
Moreover, we define
Di := 1D(i), Si := 1−Di = 1S(i), i = 1, . . . , N.
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The resulting balance sheets at time t = T are depicted on the right-hand side of Figure 1.
As a consequence of the stochasticity of the asset values Xi(T ), also the equity values Ei(T ), the
sets D and S and the variables Di and Si are random. The natural question arises whether the
knowledge of X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) at time T fully determines D, S and Ei(T ) through equations
(2.2) and (2.3). In the model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) the existence and uniqueness of
solutions to (2.2) and (2.3) would immediately follow from the strict positivity of all Xi(T ). This
condition, however, is no longer sufficient for uniqueness under the zero recovery assumption as
the following simple counterexample demonstrates.
Example 2.2 Suppose there are two firms in the system owing each other $10 at maturity
with neither cash deposits nor external liabilities. If both firms have realized operating assets
amounting to X1(T ) = X2(T ) = $5 at t = T , there are two different solutions to equations (2.2)
and (2.3):
(1) D = {1, 2}, S = ∅ and E1(T ) = E2(T ) = −$5, and
(2) D = ∅, S = {1, 2} and E1(T ) = E2(T ) = $5.
The emergence of multiple solutions in the previous example highlights the remaining point
of indeterminancy in our model: To what extent is clearing between distressed firms, or more
precisely, the netting of mutual claims allowed? In the first solution of Example 2.2, netting
is forbidden and both firms default because neither of them is able to initiate the promised
payment to the other one. In the second solution, netting is permitted, so both firms abandon
their claims and survive with $5 each. Of course, the degree to which netting of claims occurs
depends on many external factors such as the availability of short-term fundings or the degree
of counterparty anonymity. However, as we shall see in Section 3, it is always possible to find
and characterize the solution to (2.2) and (2.3) with the maximal or the minimal number of
surviving firms, corresponding to the situation where netting is always permitted or prohibited.
The non-uniqueness issue as encountered in Example 2.2 is common to cascade models with
bankruptcy costs, cf. Rogers and Veraart (2013), Elliott et al. (2014) and Hurd (2016). A general
criterion for uniqueness versus non-uniqueness seems to be missing in the literature, and hopeless
if it is required to hold ω-wise for all possible outcomes of X1(T )(ω), . . . , XN (T )(ω).
However, we will show that it is possible to characterize all models where uniqueness holds
almost surely. The most efficient way to do so is to represent the interfirm liabilities by a
graphical structure. In this article, we only consider directed graphs G = (V, E) where V is some
finite vertex set and E ⊆ {(i, j) : i, j ∈ V, i 6= j} some edge set without self-loops. The following
graphical representation of the interfirm liabilities plays a crucial role in the default analysis of
the firm network described above.
Definition 2.3 Abbreviating [N ] := {1, . . . , N}, we define the redemption graph G = (V, E)
as the graph on the vertex set V := [N ] with edges E := {(i, j) ∈ [N ]2 : Lji > 0}.
Thus, there is an edge from i to j precisely when i has borrowed money from j at time t = 0
and has to repay the latter at time t = T . In graphical terms, this is denoted by i →G j or
i ∈ paG(j), and we say that i is a parent of j in G. A whole sequence i1 →G . . . →G in with
n ≥ 2 is then called a (directed) path from i1 to in, and a (directed) cycle if i1 = in. If G contains
no directed cycles, G is called a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
For future reference, let us also introduce some further terminology. A vertex i is called
an ancestor of j, and j a descendant of i, in short i ∈ anG(j) and j ∈ deG(i), if there exists
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a directed path from i to j in G. Nodes in ndG(i) := V \ ({i} ∪ deG(i)) are called the non-
descendants of i. Given an additional sequence (xi)i∈V , we also write paG(xi) := (xj : j ∈ paG(i)),
and define anG(xi), deG(xi) and ndG(xi) analogously. If I ⊆ V, we set paG(I) :=
⋃
i∈I paG(i),
deG(I) :=
⋃
i∈I deG(i), ndG(I) :=
⋂
i∈I ndG(i) and xI := (xi : i ∈ I).
Returning to the question of uniqueness of solutions to (2.2) and (2.3), our first main result
asserts that the decision can be made by sole inspection of the redemption graph.
Theorem 2.4. Let G be the redemption graph underlying the considered financial network.
(1) If G is a DAG, there exists a unique solution to (2.2) and (2.3) with probability 1, so D, S and
E1(T ), . . . , EN (T ) are uniquely determined for almost all realizations of X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ).
(2) If G is not a DAG but contains a directed cycle, there is a strictly positive probability that
the realizations X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) are such that (2.2) and (2.3) have multiple solutions.
3 Default probabilities for interconnected firms
As shown in Theorem 2.4, directed cycles in the financial system (as observed in Example 2.2)
impose the only hindrance to the uniqueness of solutions to (2.2) and (2.3). So if the redemption
graph G is a DAG, the random variables D1, . . . , DN are well defined, and in this case, their
joint distribution has a particularly convenient structure.
Definition 3.1 Given a DAG G = (V, E), a collection {Xi : i ∈ V} of random variables taking
values in a finite set E is said to form a Bayesian network over G if for all e = (ei : i ∈ V) ∈ E|V|
we have
P[XV = e] =
∏
i∈V
P[Xi = ei | paG(Xi) = paG(ei)]. (3.1)
For a detailed treatment of Bayesian networks we refer to the monographs Lauritzen (1996)
and Koller and Friedman (2009). An equivalent characterization is this (see Theorem 3.27 in
Lauritzen (1996)): {Xi : i ∈ V} forms a Bayesian network over G if and only if for every i ∈ V,
the variable Xi is conditionally independent of XndG(i) given XpaG(i). Thus, a Bayesian net-
work structure can be understood as a collection of conditional independence statements among
variables.
Theorem 3.2. If the redemption graph G is a DAG, the variables {D1, . . . , DN} form a Bayesian
network on G with conditional probabilities
P[Di = 1 | paG(Di)] = Φ(i,Σi, T ), P[Di = 0 | paG(Di)] = 1− Φ(i,Σi, T ), i ∈ [N ], (3.2)
where
Σi := {j ∈ paG(i) : Dj = 0}, (3.3)
Φ(i,Σi, T ) := Φ
(
− log(Q(i,Σi)) + (µi − σ
2
i /2)T
σi
√
T
)
, (3.4)
Q(i,Σi) :=
Xi(
er′0TFi +
∑N
j=1 erjiTLji − er0TKi −
∑
j∈Σi erijTLij
)+ , (3.5)
and Φ is the standard normal distribution function, x+ := max(x, 0) and a/0 := ∞ for a > 0,
log(∞) :=∞, and Φ(−∞) := 0.
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In particular, for all Σ ⊆ [N ] we have that
P[S = Σ, D = [N ] \ Σ] =
∏
i∈[N ]\Σ
Φ(i,Σ, T )
∏
i∈Σ
(1− Φ(i,Σ, T )). (3.6)
Let us give an informal explanation why an acyclic redemption graph leads to a Bayesian
network structure of D1, . . . , DN . Indeed, every DAG G induces a partial order .G on its vertex
set via the relation
i .G j :⇐⇒ i ∈ anG(j) or i = j. (3.7)
Therefore, starting with institutions that are minimal with respect to .G (i.e., institutions that
have not lent money to anybody else), we can determine the values of D1, . . . , DN iteratively
along the partial order .G. The Bayesian network structure follows now from the observation
that this iteration procedure is “Markovian” with respect to .G: For each i ∈ [N ], the variable
Di is independent of (Dj : j .G i) given (Dj : j ∈ paG(i)), or equivalently, in order to determine
the default behavior of i, it suffices to know whether its debtors are solvent or not. The formal
proof of Theorem 3.2 can be found in the Appendix.
When the redemption graph has directed cycles, additional rules to (2.2) and (2.3) have to
be set up for D1, . . . , DN to be well defined. These rules may be different for each cycle or vary
from firm to firm. The following result, however, holds for all consistent extensions of (2.2) and
(2.3) (i.e., measurable mappings of the values X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) to D1, . . . , DN such that (2.2)
and (2.3) are valid). Recall that the subgraph of G = (V, E) induced by I ⊆ V is the graph
GI := (I, EI) with EI := I2 ∩ E .
Proposition 3.3. Formula (3.6) is valid if both the induced subgraphs GΣ and G[N ]\Σ contain
no directed cycles. In the general case, (3.6) still holds with a “≤”-sign instead of equality.
Apart from Proposition 3.3, there is not much more that can be said about a particularly
chosen solution to (2.2) and (2.3). However, further structural results can be obtained for the two
“extreme” cases, that is, where the set of surviving firms is maximal or minimal, respectively.
Definition 3.4 The mild default rule specifies the sets S and D in the following way.
• If the operating assets and cash holdings of some firm i are so low that it cannot meet its
obligations at time t = T even if it is paid back by all its debtors, then i defaults and is
called a defaulting firm of the first round. In this case we write i ∈ D1. If no firm falls into
this category, all firms survive and D = ∅ and S = [N ].
• For n ∈ {2, . . . , N} we call i ∈ [N ] \⋃n−1m=1Dm a defaulting firm of the n-th round, denoted
i ∈ Dn, if at time t = T firm i is insolvent given it receives all contractual payments except
for those from their debtors in ⋃n−1m=1Dm.
• As soon as Dn = ∅, we set Dn+1 = . . . = DN = ∅, D = ⋃n−1m=1Dm and S = [N ] \ D.
Definition 3.5 Under the strict default rule the sets S and D are determined as follows.
• Every firm i whose operating assets and cash holdings at time t = T are large enough to
repay its creditors (regardless whether it receives payments from the other firms) survives.
In this case, we call i a surviving firm of the first round and write i ∈ S1. If no firm meets
this criterion, all firms default: S = ∅ and D = [N ].
• For every n ∈ {2, . . . , N} we call i ∈ [N ] \ ⋃n−1m=1 Sm a surviving firm of the n-th round,
denoted i ∈ Sn, if at time t = T its operating assets, its cash holdings and the payments
it receives from firms in ⋃n−1m=1 Sm are high enough to redeem its debts.
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• As soon as Sn = ∅, we set Sn+1 = . . . = SN = ∅, S = ⋃n−1m=1 Sm and D = [N ] \ S.
Both the mild and the strict default rules are variants of the fictitious default algorithm
of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart (2013), the loss cascades described in
Cont et al. (2013), the cascade hierarchies of Elliott et al. (2014), or the clearing algorithms of
Kusnetsov and Veraart (2016).
Proposition 3.6. We state some immediate consequences of Definitions 3.4 and 3.5.
(1) The sets S and D specified by the mild or the strict default rule are consistent extensions of
(2.2) and (2.3).
(2) For every consistent extension of (2.2) and (2.3), the survival set contains the one prescribed
by the strict default rule and is included in the one given by the mild default rule. Similarly,
the default set under a consistent extension is always a superset of the default set under the
mild default rule and a subset of the default set under the strict default rule.
(3) Under the mild (strict) default rule, if Σ ⊆ [N ] and G[N ]\Σ (GΣ) has no directed cycles,
then formula (3.6) is valid.
Apart from the special cases discussed in the previous results, the presence of cycles in G
prevents us from a concise description of the joint probability distribution of D1, . . . , DN using
Bayesian network methods. However, under the mild or the strict default rule, the Bayesian
network structure can be recovered if we “blow up” the redemption graph in a suitable way.
The idea here is to explicitly incorporate the cascade mechanism behind the mild or the strict
default rule into the graphical structure. Instead of a single variable Di that determines whether
firm i defaults or not, we keep track of a whole tuple of variables Din, n ∈ [N ], that depend
on whether i defaults in the n-th round. In fact, to reduce the number of new variables as far
as possible, it suffices to consider this separately for the strongly connected components of the
redemption graph G. These are the equivalence classes induced by the equivalence relation
i ∼G j :⇐⇒ i .G j and j .G i, i, j ∈ [N ];
or in economic terms, these are the maximal subsets of firms where any two of them have a
direct or an indirect lender–borrower relationship via intermediate firms.
Definition 3.7 Let C1, . . . , Cm be the strongly connected components in G and Ni the size
of the strongly connected component firm i belongs to. The acyclic augmentation of G is the
graph G¯ := (V¯, E¯) with the vertex set
V¯ := {(i, n) : i ∈ [N ], n ∈ [Ni]} (3.8)
and the edge set
E¯ := {((j,Nj), (i, n)) : j ∈ paG(i) ∩ ndG(i), n = 1, . . . , Ni}
∪
N⋃
i=1
{(
(i, n), (i, n+ 1)
)
: Ni > 1, n = 1, . . . , Ni − 1
}
∪
m⋃
k=1
{(
(j, n), (i, n+ 1)
)
: i, j ∈ Ck, j ∈ paG(i), n = 1, . . . , Ni − 1
}
∪
m⋃
k=1
{(
(j, n), (i, n+ 2)
)
: i, j ∈ Ck, j ∈ paG(i), Ni > 2, n = 1, . . . , Ni − 2
}
. (3.9)
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In words, we first create Ni vertex copies in G¯ for each firm i ∈ [N ], numbered from (i, 1) to
(i,Ni). Then the first type of edges in (3.9) connects two directly linked firms i and j in G that
belong to different strongly connected components: Namely, if j has to repay i at time T , the last
copy of j is connected to each copy of i. The second type of linkages connects consecutive copies
of a fixed firm. The third (resp. fourth) type of edges joins consecutive (resp. next-but-one)
copies of two firms that are directly linked to each other in G and belong to the same strongly
connected component.
1 4
2 3
5
6
7
9
8
(a) G
11 12 13 14
21 22 23 24
31 32 33 34
41 42 43 44
61
71
51
81
91
(b) G¯
Figure 2: A cyclic redemption graph G and its acyclic augmentation G¯.
Figure 2 shows an example of a cyclic graph and its acyclic augmentation. As we can see,
although G has a directed cycle (the vertices {1, 2, 3, 4} form a strongly connected component),
its augmentation G¯ has no cycles. Of course, this holds in general.
Lemma 3.8. The acyclic augmentation G¯ of the redemption graph G is a DAG.
Next we associate random variables to the vertices of G¯, in such a way that they contain our
variables of interest D1, . . . , DN as subsets and form a Bayesian network on G¯. We first assume
the mild default rule; for the strict default rule, all definitions and results are analogous and will
be provided afterwards.
Definition 3.9 Let Ni be as in Definition 3.7. For i ∈ [N ] and n ∈ [Ni], we define Di0 := 0
and then inductively Din = 1 if
Xi(T ) + er0TKi +
∑
j∈paG(i)∩ndG(i)
erijTLij1{DjNj=0} +
∑
j∈paG(i)∩deG(i)
erijTLij1{Dj,n−1=0}
− er′0TFi −
N∑
j=1
erjiTLji < 0, (3.10)
and Din = 0 otherwise.
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To paraphrase, we first order the strongly connected components ofG in such a way that firms
in a given component have no borrowings from firms in previous components. Then, starting
with those components that have no borrowings from any other component, we assign the value
1 to Din exactly when firm i defaults assuming it only receives payments from surviving firms
of previous strongly connected components and from firms j in the same component that have
not defaulted up to the (n− 1)-st step, that is, where Dj,n−1 = 0.
Theorem 3.10. Under the mild default rule the following statements are valid.
(1) For all i ∈ [N ] and n ∈ [Ni] we have Di,n−1 ≤ Din and Di = DiNi.
(2) The random variables {Din : i ∈ [N ], n ∈ [Ni]} form a Bayesian network on G¯ with condi-
tional probabilities given by
P[Di1 = 1 | paG¯(Di1)] = Φ(i,Σmi1, T ),
P[Din = 1 | paG¯(Din)] =
1 if Di,n−1 = 1,Φ(i,Σmin,T )−Φ(i,Σmi,n−1,T )
1−Φ(i,Σmi,n−1,T ) if Di,n−1 = 0,
n = 2, . . . , Ni, (3.11)
where
Σmin := {j ∈ paG(i) ∩ ndG(i) : DjNj = 0} ∪ {j ∈ paG(i) ∩ deG(i) : Dj,n−1 = 0}, n ∈ [Ni].
Although the variable Din does not explicitly depend on Di,n−2 in Definition 3.9, we have to
form the next-but-one edges in G¯ (i.e., the last of the four types of edges in (3.9)). The reason
behind is that on the event Di,n−1 = 0, the values Dj,n−2 of parents j belonging to the same
strongly connected component as i contain important information about Xi(T ). For example, if
Dj,n−2 = 1 for many such parents (so i survives in round n− 1 even though many of its parents
have defaulted in round n− 2), the value Xi(T ) has to exceed a higher threshold compared to a
situation where Dj,n−2 = 0 for many j. Furthermore, the differences Dj,n−1−Dj,n−2 influence the
likelihood whether Di,n−1 = Din = 0 or 0 = Di,n−1 < Din = 1. In fact, if Dj,n−1 −Dj,n−2 = 0
for all parents j, then necessarily the first alternative occurs. By contrast, the likelihood for
the second alternative increases with the frequency that Dj,n−1 − Dj,n−2 = 1 occurs. These
considerations are reflected in formula (3.10) via the dependence on Σmi,n−1, which involves the
variables (Dj,n−2 : j ∈ paG(i) ∩ deG(i)).
Next we present analogous statements for the strict default rule, which are simpler to for-
mulate in terms of survival variables.
Definition 3.11 Under the strict default rule we define for i ∈ [N ] and n ∈ [Ni] the variables
Si0 := 0, and Sin := 1 if
Xi(T ) + er0TKi +
∑
j∈paG(i)∩ndG(i)
erijTLij1{SjNj=1} +
∑
j∈paG(i)∩deG(i)
erijTLij1{Sj,n−1=1}
− er′0TFi −
N∑
j=1
erjiTLji ≥ 0, (3.12)
and Sin := 0 otherwise.
Theorem 3.12. Under the strict default rule the following statements are valid.
(1) For all i ∈ [N ] and n ∈ [Ni] we have Si,n−1 ≤ Sin and Si = SiNi.
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(2) The random variables {Sin : i ∈ [N ], n ∈ [Ni]} form a Bayesian network on G¯ with condi-
tional probabilities given by
P[Si1 = 0 | paG¯(Si1)] = Φ(i,Σsi1, T ),
P[Sin = 0 | paG¯(Sin)] =
0 if Si,n−1 = 1,Φ(i,Σsin,T )Φ(i,Σsi,n−1,T ) if Si,n−1 = 0, n = 2, . . . , Ni, (3.13)
where
Σsin := {j ∈ paG(i) ∩ ndG(i) : SjNj = 1} ∪ {j ∈ paG(i) ∩ deG(i) : Sj,n−1 = 1}, n ∈ [Ni].
The quintessence of this section is that the default variables D1, . . . , DN associated to the
financial institutions form a Bayesian network in the case of an acyclic redemption graph, and
that they can be embedded as margins into a larger random vector with a Bayesian network
structure in the cyclic case. But of course, these results are obtained under the hypotheses on
the financial system made in Section 2. The question how modifications of these assumptions
affect the Bayesian network structure will be addressed in Section 5.
4 Implications of the Bayesian network structure
We have proved in Theorems 3.2, 3.10 and 3.12 that the default and survival random variables
associated to firms with mutual liabilities form a Bayesian network over the redemption graph
or a suitable augmentation thereof. In this section, we elaborate the benefits of this Bayesian
network structure for systemic risk analysis.
4.1 Independence detection
It is important for both the involved institutions and regulatory authorities to determine whether
the default of different firms depends on each other or not, and how this relationship is affected
by the state of other firms. The underlying Bayesian network structure permits us to reduce
this question to a graph-theoretic analysis. More precisely, given the evidence of Dk, k ∈ K,
for some subset K ⊆ [N ], one can determine by sole inspection of G¯, the augmentation of the
redemption graph G from Definition 3.7, whether {Di : i ∈ I} and {Dj : j ∈ J} for two further
subsets I, J ⊆ [N ] depend on each other or not.
The key concept here is called d-separation, see p. 48 in Lauritzen (1996):
Definition 4.1 Let G = (V, E) be a graph.
(1) We call i1 
G . . .
G in a chain between i1 and in if for every j ∈ [n−1] we have ij →G ij+1
or ij+1 →G ij (or both).
(2) For three pairwise disjoint subsets V0, V1, V2 of V, the sets V1 and V2 are called d-separated
in G given V0 (or simply d-separated if V0 = ∅) if every chain i1 
G . . . 
G in in G from
some i1 ∈ V1 to some in ∈ V2 is blocked by V0, that is, for some j = 2, . . . , n− 1 we have
• ij−1 →G ij →G ij+1 and ij ∈ V0 (type I structure), or
• ij−1 ←G ij ←G ij+1 and ij ∈ V0 (type II structure), or
• ij−1 ←G ij →G ij+1 and ij ∈ V0 (type III structure), or
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• ij−1 →G ij ←G ij+1 and ij /∈ V0 and deG(ij) ∩ V0 = ∅ (type IV structure).
For example, if G is a DAG, then for every i ∈ V the sets {i} and ndG(i) are d-separated in G
given paG(i). If random variables {Xi : i ∈ V} form a Bayesian network on G, the fundamental
result is the following, see Corollary 3.23 together with Proposition 3.25 in Lauritzen (1996): If V1
and V2 are d-separated in G given V0, then the two collections of random variables {Xi : i ∈ V1}
and {Xi : i ∈ V2} are conditionally independent given {Xi : i ∈ V0}. Numerical algorithms for
checking d-separation are well established and efficient, see Section 3.3 of Koller and Friedman
(2009).
Applied to the acyclic augmentation G¯ = (V¯, E¯) of the redemption graph, the d-separation
criterion provides a graphical tool for detecting independence between different groups of firms
regarding their default behavior. In fact, d-separation is “almost” necessary for independence
(see Theorem 7 of Meek (1995)): If V0, V1 and V2 are subsets of V¯, and V1 and V2 are not d-
separated given V0, then for almost all volatility parameters σi the random variables {Di : i ∈ V1}
and {Di : i ∈ V2} are stochastically dependent given {Di : i ∈ V0} if none of the variables Di,
i ∈ V1∪V2, becomes deterministic given {Di : i ∈ V0}. The next proposition relates d-separation
in G to d-separation in G¯.
Proposition 4.2. Let G be the redemption graph and G¯ its acyclic augmentation. Then the
following assertions hold for all pairwise disjoints subsets V1, V2 and V3 of [N ].
(1) V1 and V2 are d-separated in G if and only if {(i,Ni) : i ∈ V1} and {(i,Ni) : i ∈ V2} are
d-separated in G¯.
(2) If V1 and V2 are d-separated in G given V0, then {(i, n) : i ∈ V1, n ∈ [Ni]} and {(i, n) : i ∈
V2, n ∈ [Ni]} are d-separated in G¯ given {(i, n) : i ∈ V0, n ∈ [Ni]}.
4.2 Measures of systemic impact
In the systemic risk literature several measures of systemic importance for interconnected firms
have been proposed. While some approaches like in Acemoglu et al. (2015), Battiston et al.
(2012) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) are purely based on the underlying network structure and
parameters, others explicitly take the probabilistic nature of contagion into account. Examples
for the latter category include the contagion index of Cont et al. (2013), the CoVaR measure
of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), the SES and SRISK measures of Acharya et al. (2016) and
Brownlees and Engle (2017), and the general systemic risk measures of Biagini et al. (2015)
and Feinstein et al. (2016). Based on the structural cascade model analyzed in Sections 2 and
3, we contribute two further probabilisitic measures of systemic risk that are flexible (one can
measure the impact of a single firm or a group of firms, unconditionally or conditionally on
different stress scenarios), feasible (they can be computed by the methods described in the next
subsection) and robust (they depend continuously on the underlying model parameters).
In the following, if not otherwise stated, any consistent extension of (2.2) and (2.3) can be
considered, in particular both the mild and the strict default rule.
Definition 4.3 For two disjoint subsets I and J of [N ], the absolute and the relative systemic
impact (ASI and RSI) of I on J are defined as (we use 1 to denote a vector with all entries equal
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to one)
ASI(I, J) := max
J0⊆J, e∈{0,1}|J0|
(
P[DJ0 = e | DI = 1]− P[DJ0 = e]
)
(4.1)
and RSI(I, J) := max
e∈{0,1}|J|
log2
P[DJ = e | DI = 1]
P[DJ = e]
, (4.2)
respectively. In (4.2), we set log2 0 = −∞, and 0/0 = 1 in case the denominator, and, as a
consequence, also the numerator is zero.
The ASI of I on J equals the total variation distance between the distribution of DJ and
its conditional distribution given DI = 1. Moreover, the RSI of I on J is the Re´nyi divergence
of order +∞ between the same pair of distributions. Of course, instead of taking the maximum
in (4.1) and (4.2), also Lp-type measures can be investigated. For example, one can define L1-
analogues of the ASI and the RSI measures based on mutual information and the Kullback-Leibler
divergence. We do not go into details at this point but only refer to van Erven and Harremoe¨s
(2014) for more information on distances between probability measures.
Turning to the literature on Bayesian networks, we found, to our surprise, only little re-
search where measures of importance for vertices in a network are investigated. Most notably, in
Chapter 4 of Pinto (1986) (cf. Pearl (1988), Chapter 6.4), the author proposes quantifying the
relevance of a vertex Y for another vertex X by a function depending on the distribution of X
and its conditional distribution given Y . They give a version of the ASI measure as an example.
Furthermore, Chan and Darwiche (2005) employ a symmetric version of the RSI measure in the
context of sensitivity analysis for Bayesian networks.
Next, we collect some basic properties of the ASI and RSI measures.
Proposition 4.4. The following assertions hold for disjoint sets I, J ⊆ [N ].
(1) ASI(I, J) ∈ [0, 1) and RSI(I, J) ∈ [0,∞).
(2) If J1 ⊆ J , then ASI(I, J1) ≤ ASI(I, J) and RSI(I, J1) ≤ RSI(I, J).
(3) An explicit formula for (4.1) is
ASI(I, J) =
∑
e∈{0,1}|J|
(
P[DJ = e | DI = 1]− P[DJ = e]
)+
= 12
∑
e∈{0,1}|J|
∣∣P[DJ = e | DI = 1]− P[DJ = e]∣∣. (4.3)
(4) In contrast to (4.1), there is no need to consider subsets of J in (4.2) because
RSI(I, J) = max
J0⊆J, e∈{0,1}|J0|
log2
P[DJ0 = e | DI = 1]
P[DJ0 = e]
. (4.4)
(5) Under the strict default rule, if I = I1 ∪ I2 and I2 and J are d-separated in G given I1, then
ASI(I, J) = ASI(I1, J) and RSI(I, J) = RSI(I1, J).
One would also expect ASI(I1, J) ≤ ASI(I, J) and RSI(I1, J) ≤ RSI(I, J) to hold for I1 ⊆ I
since the knowledge of default of a larger set of firms ought to be worse, or at least not better,
for the survival of another firm in the network. However, a simple counterexample demonstrates
that this intuition is wrong.
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Example 4.5 We consider a network of N = 5 institutions with redemption graph as in
Figure 3 and zero interest rates. Further suppose that F3 = F4 = K3 = K4 = $0, that is, both
firm 3 and firm 4 have neither cash nor external liabilities at time t = T . Moreover, we make
the following assumptions on the firms’ operative performance.
• µ1 = µ2 are very high and σ1 = σ2 are strictly positive but small.
• µ3 and µ4 are strongly negative, and σ3 and σ4 are small in comparison.
• X1 = X2 such that X1(T ) and X2(T ) are independent with the same distribution.
1
2
4
3
5
$20
$10
$10
$15
$15
Figure 3: Redemption graph for the firm network of Example 4.5.
As a consequence of the first hypothesis, the probabilities of default for firms 1 and 2 are
very small but strictly positive. Moreover, by the second assumption, without repayment from
firms 1 and 2, firms 3 and 4 have almost no chance to survive and pay back firm 5. However, as
soon as firm 1 survives, also firm 4 survives, and as soon as both firm 1 and firm 2 are solvent,
also firm 3 is so. Hence we obtain:
• P[D4 = 1] ≈ 0 because firm 1 has a very high chance of survival such that also firm 4 is
most likely to survive.
• P[D4 = 1 | D3 = 1] ≈ 1/2 because conditional on the default of firm 3, the event of exactly
one failure among 1 and 2 is almost one (the probability of both firms surviving is zero
because otherwise 3 would not have defaulted, and the probability of a joint default of 1
and 2 is still comparatively small). Since only the failure of firm 1 triggers the default of
4, and X1(T ) and X2(T ) are identically distributed, the conditional default probability of
4 given the default of 3 is around 1/2.
• P[D4 = 1 | D2 = D3 = 1] ≈ 0 because the failure of 2 already explains the failure of 3, so
the latter gives us almost no additional information about 1 (and therefore 4).
As a result, ASI({2, 3}, {4}) ≤ ASI({3}, {4}) and RSI({2, 3}, {4}) ≤ RSI({3}, {4}).
4.3 Computation of default probabilities
In addition to finding the dependence relations among interconnected networks, another central
objective of risk management is to determine the default probabilities of firms or the impact
of a firm’s default on other firms, measured, for example, in terms of the ASI and RSI of the
previous subsection. Known as the probabilistic inference problem in the artificial intelligence
community, this topic has been extensively studied in the literature of Bayesian networks, where
various exact or approximative algorithms have been developed for this purpose (see Koller and
Friedman (2009) for an in-depth treatment on this subject). In order to illustrate the results and
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Figure 4: A core–periphery structured redemption graph.
concepts of the previous sections, we demonstrate in a numerical example how these inference
algorithms can be applied to our setting. All numerical computations in the following are made
using the junction tree algorithm within the open-source Bayes Net Toolbox for Matlab (Murphy,
2001).
We consider a financial network with N = 100 banks in total where the redemption graph is
depicted in Figure 4. The network has a core–periphery structure in the sense that the first five
banks form a complete network where all possible lending relationships are present, and each of
these core banks has further borrowed money from 19 different periphery banks. We refer to the
papers Elsinger et al. (2006), Cont et al. (2013), Craig and von Peter (2014) and Langfield et al.
(2014) for empirical evidence of such structures in real banking networks. The time horizon in
our example is T = 1 year, all interest rates are zero, and we assume statistical equality among
all core banks and among all periphery banks:
µC = 0.1, σC = 0.2, XC = 2000, FC = 500, LCC = 1600/(N − 1) = 400,
µP = 0.05, σP = 0.1, XP = 80, FP = 90, LPC = 35 (if C→ P).
The subscript C (P) here represents an arbitrary core (periphery) banks. Figure 5 displays the
probability distribution of the number of defaults in the resulting financial systems under the
mild and the strict default rule. While the shape of the default distribution is the same for both
the mild and the strict default rule, the actual probabilities are very different. No default occurs
under the mild rule with a probability of 99.39%, but this probability decreases to 31.15% when
the strict rule applies. This discrepancy is due to the fact that a core bank only has a 11.13%
chance to survive without the repayment of the other core banks, but a 99.90% chance if it
receives full repayment. As a consequence, in the considered example, the possibility of netting
mutual claims is decisive whether the contagion cascade becomes unleashed or not.
From Figure 5 we can observe several prominent qualitative features of the default distribu-
tion. First of all, the distribution is multimodal, corresponding to the number of core banks in
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Figure 5: Default probabilities under the mild default rule (solid line) and the strict default rule
(dashed line).
default. Indeed, conditional on the default of a core bank, each periphery bank with lendings
to this core bank defaults (independently) with a probability of 76.66%. Thus, whenever a core
bank defaults, it triggers the default of 19× 76.66% = 14.57 periphery banks on average, which
explains why for both the mild and the strict rule the default distribution has modes at distances
of 15 or 16 (one core bank plus 14 or 15 periphery banks).
Furthermore, we observe that also the probabilities at the modes are not monotone. This is
caused by contagious effects among the core banks. When enough core banks default, it is rather
likely that even more core banks default: The probability function of the number of defaulting
core banks is not monotone as Figure 6 reveals.
Last but not least, the probabilities beyond the last mode with 78 defaults fall into the large
deviation regime and decrease exponentially fast.
The measures of systemic impact introduced in the previous subsection can also be calculated
in our example. For simplicity, we only report figures for the mild default rule; the computations
under the strict default rule are completely analogous. To this end, let C and C′ be two arbitrary
core banks and P and P′ be two periphery banks that are creditors of C and C′, respectively.
For the absolute systemic impact of C we obtain
ASI({C}, {C′}) = P[DC′ = 1 | DC = 1]− P[DC′ = 1] = 36.21%− 0.14% = 36.07%,
ASI({C}, {P}) = P[DP = 1 | DC = 1]− P[DP = 1] = 76.66%− 0.11% = 76.55%,
ASI({C}, {P′}) = P[DP′ = 1 | DC = 1]− P[DP′ = 1] = 27.76%− 0.11% = 27.65%,
which translates to the relative systemic impact of C as
RSI({C}, {C′}) = 7.97, RSI({C}, {P}) = 9.42, RSI({C}, {P′}) = 7.96.
Concering the ASI and RSI of periphery banks, we fix another periphery bank P′′ that is, like
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Figure 6: Distribution of the number of defaulting core banks under the mild rule (solid bars)
and the strict rule (dashed bars).
P, also a creditor of C. Then we obtain
ASI({P}, {C}) = P[DC = 1 | DP = 1]− P[DC = 1] = 98.79%− 0.14% = 98.65%,
ASI({P}, {C′}) = P[DC′ = 1 | DP = 1]− P[DC′ = 1] = 35.78%− 0.14% = 35.63%,
ASI({P}, {P′}) = P[DP′ = 1 | DP = 1]− P[DP′ = 1] = 27.43%− 0.11% = 27.32%,
ASI({P}, {P′′}) = P[DP′′ = 1 | DP = 1]− P[DP′′ = 1] = 75.74%− 0.11% = 75.63%,
and
RSI({P}, {C}) = 9.42, RSI({P}, {C′}) = 7.96, RSI({P}, {P′}) = 7.94,
RSI({P}, {P′′}) = 9.40.
As both the ASI and RSI reveal, even banks that are not direct counterparties may be sys-
temically important for each other. For instance, if a core bank defaults, the default probability
of a periphery bank increases by 27.65% (or by a factor of 27.96 ≈ 248) even if it has no lend-
ings to that defaulted core bank. Another observation is that also periphery banks have a high
systemic impact although they have no borrowings from other banks in the system. The reason
behind is simply that periphery banks that are repaid by their core bank counterparty survive
with a probability larger than 99.99%. So if a periphery bank defaults, this is very likely caused
by the default of its core bank counterparty.
5 Conclusion and outlook
In this paper we analyzed a financial contagion model in which the joint default probability
distribution of the system can be characterized in terms of a Bayesian network on a graph de-
termined by the interfirm liabilities. We further explained how this graphical structure can be
employed to detect systemic dependencies within the network, to define measures of systemic
importance for institutions and to compute their conditional or unconditional default probabili-
ties. Since the involved methodologies apply to all possible networks, this work provides a useful
device to analyze and monitor the systemic risk in financial systems.
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Naturally, we did impose various conditions on the financial network, so let us comment
on possible generalizations. First of all, regarding probabilistic assumptions, the log-normal
hypothesis on the evolution of the operating firm assets is merely for simplicity. The Bayesian
network structure of the default variables is preserved if we assume another distribution for the
asset returns. Only the conditional probabilities stated in Theorems 3.2, 3.10 and 3.12 have to
be adapted.
The situation is different if we allow for dependent asset returns of the financial institu-
tions. Of course, if one is only interested in computing default probabilities using Monte Carlo
techniques, this is still feasible as long as the joint asset return distribution can be simulated
from. However, the Bayesian network structure of the default variables D1, . . . , DN will be lost
in general because observations of non-descendant institutions (with respect to the redemption
graph) may reveal additional information about the driving noise. But let us suppose that each
institution i is driven by a finite number of common market noises W1, . . . ,WK plus its own
idiosyncratic noise Bi, assuming that the Bi’s are still independent and also independent of the
Wj ’s. Then conditional on the Wj ’s, the variables D1, . . . , DN will have a Bayesian network
structure. Hence, our approach permits default risk analysis under various market situations,
which is useful for stress testing, for instance.
Other generalizations may concern the assumptions on the financial system itself and the
way institutions are interconnected. In our model, all mutual exposures are loans with two
possible values at the end of the period (depending on whether the counterparty fails or not).
It would be more realistic to include other types of exposures: For example, exposures with
continuously varying values like asset cross-holdings (cf. Gourie´roux et al. (2012) and Elliott
et al. (2014)), exposures with different seniorities, exposures with a non-zero recovery rate in
the case of counterparty default, or exposures with different maturity dates. These considerations
clearly go beyond the scope of the current paper and are left to future research.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.4. (1) If G is a DAG, the relation .G defined in (3.7) induces a
partial order on {1, . . . , N} with a non-empty set V1 of minimal nodes with respect to .G,
which precisely contains those firms that have not lent money to any other firm. For such a firm
i ∈ V1, the equation for Ei(T ) in (2.3) is explicit: It does not depend on any other j 6= i because
Lij = 0. Next, we consider the minimal nodes in V \ V1 with respect to .GV\V1 , that is, those
firms that have only lent money to firms in V1. Their values Ei(T ) are given by an expression
involving Ej(T ) only for j ∈ V1. Iterating this at most N times, we obtain an explicit formula
for all Ei(T ) in terms of X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) and the model parameters.
(2) Now we suppose that G has a directed cycle, say, involving the firms 1, . . . , N0 in that
order. By assumption (2.1), for each firm i ∈ {N0+1, . . . , N} there exists a range [x(1)i , x(2)i ) with
0 = x(1)i < x
(2)
i such that i necessarily defaults whenever Xi(T ) falls into this interval. For the N0
firms within the cycle we first define L0 to be the smallest amount a firm in {1, . . . , N0} has to
repay to its creditor within the cycle. An inspection of (2.3) reveals that there exists a rectangle∏N0
i=1[x
(1)
i , x
(2)
i ) with x
(1)
i < x
(2)
i and the following property: When (X1(T ), . . . , XN0(T )) lies in
that rectangle, then each firm in [N0] is able to repay the external liabilities and all its creditors
except the one in the cycle, but the remaining asset value is larger than the debt owed to this
cycle creditor minus L0. As a result, if (X1(T ), . . . , XN (T )) ∈ ∏Ni=1[x(1)i , x(2)i ), which is an event
with strictly positive probability, then one solution would be that all firms default, and another
would be that the firms in the cycle survive while all other firms default. 2
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. This theorem is a special case of Theorem 3.12. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.3. That (3.6) holds with “≤” is immediate: If S = Σ, equation (2.3)
becomes an explicit expression in terms of Xi(T ) and the model parameters for each i ∈ [N ].
The independence of X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) together with their log-normal distributions yields (3.6)
with “≤”. In order to prove equality when both GΣ and G[N ]\Σ are DAGs, we consider the
situation where X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) satisfy (2.2) and (2.3) with S = Σ. We have to show that
all other choices S = Σ′ with Σ′ 6= Σ would violate (2.2) and (2.3). Since GΣ is a DAG, the
relation .GΣ induces a partial order on Σ. The minimal nodes in Σ with respect to that partial
order, denoted by Σ1, correspond to firms that survive without receiving any payment from
other firms in the network at time T . So they must belong to Σ′ whenever S = Σ′ is supposed to
satisfy (2.2) and (2.3). Next, we consider the minimal nodes in Σ \Σ1. Again, they must belong
to Σ′ because they survive regardless of the solvency of all other firms except for the minimal
nodes, which, however, are already known to survive. Inductively, this proves that Σ ⊆ Σ′ for
every potential Σ′. Similarly, because G[N ]\Σ is a DAG, the maximal elements in [N ] \Σ default
regardless whether the other firms in [N ] \ Σ default or not, so they cannot belong to Σ′. An
analogous induction argument yields [N ] \ Σ ⊆ [N ] \ Σ′, so Σ = Σ′. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.6. We assume the strict default rule; for the mild default rule, the
proof is completely analogous.
(1) It is obvious that the strict default rule maps X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) in a measurable way
to S1, . . . , SN . So we are left to prove that for i ∈ [N ] the term in (2.3) is nonnegative if and
only if i ∈ S. By Definition 3.5, the expression (2.3) for i ∈ Sn is already nonnegative when we
take the indicator 1Sn−1 (for n = 1 we set S0 := ∅), which is always less or equal to the original
indicator 1S . Since S = S1 ∪ . . . ∪ SN , this proves that (2.3) is nonnegative for all i ∈ S. By
contrast, for all i ∈ D equation (2.3) must take a strictly negative value because otherwise i
belongs to S1 ∪ . . .∪SN0+1 according to the strict default rule where N0 is the smallest number
in [N ] such that S = S1 ∪ . . . ∪ SN0 , which is obviously a contradiction.
(2) Denote by S1, . . . ,SN the surviving firms of the n-th round under the strict default
rule. As in (1), a simple induction argument shows that Sn ⊆ S holds for all n ∈ [N ] whenever
S and D satisfy (2.2) and (2.3).
(3) We have already shown in Proposition 3.3 that (3.6) always holds with “≤”. For the
reverse inequality, suppose that X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) satisfy (2.2) and (2.3) with Σ instead of S.
Under the strict default rule, the proof of the same proposition reveals that, because of the DAG
structure of GΣ, we necessarily have Σ ⊆ S, so part (2) of the current proposition completes the
proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Suppose that G¯ does have a cycle, say, of the form
(i1, n1)→G¯ . . .→G¯ (ik, nk)→G¯ (i1, n1).
Then at least one of the edges must belong to the first of the four collections of edges in (3.9)
because otherwise we would have n1 < n2 < . . . < nk < n1, which is absurd. But if the cycle has
an edge of the form ((il, Nil), (il+1, nl+1)) with il ∈ paG(il+1) ∩ ndG(il+1), there cannot exist a
path in G¯ that connects (il+1, nl+1) to (il, Nil) because, by (3.9), this would give rise to a path
in G from il+1 to il and contradict the fact that il ∈ ndG(il+1). However, this in turn produces
a contradiction to the assumption that (i1, n1), . . . , (ik, nk) form a cycle in G¯. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.10. (1) The first statement follows immediately from the definition
in (3.10). For the second statement we number the strongly connected components of G in such
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a way that no vertex in Ck has parents in Ck+1, . . . , Cm. By induction on k we may assume
that Di = DiNi holds under the mild default rule for all i ∈ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ck−1. We must prove
that Di = DiNi is true for i ∈ Ck. We first show that Di = 1 holds as soon as Din = 1 for
some n ∈ [Ni]. To this end, we proceed with another induction on n, and assume that we
already know that Dj,n−1 = 1 implies Dj = 1 for all j ∈ Ck. Then firms i ∈ Ck with Din = 1
cannot repay their debts if they only receive payments from j ∈ paG(i) \Ck with DjNj = 0 and
j ∈ paG(i) ∩ Ck with Dj,n−1 = 0. Indeed, all other firms default under the mild default rule:
Firms j ∈ paG(i) \ Ck with DjNj = 1 by the first, and firms j ∈ paG(i) ∩ Ck with Dj,n−1 = 1
by the second induction hypothesis. Thus, also i must default according to the mild default
rule. For the converse direction that Di = 1 implies DiNi = 1 for all i ∈ Ck, we recall that
D = ⋃Nn=1Dn, where Dn contains the defaulting firms of the n-th round. By induction on
n ∈ [N ], let us assume that those i ∈ Ck that belong to D1 ∪ . . . ∪ Dn−1 satisfy DiNi = 1.
Then every i ∈ Dn has a negative equity value at time T if it does not receive money back from
j ∈ paG(i)∩ (D1 ∪ . . .∪Dn−1). If such a firm j belongs to paG(i) \Ck, we have DjNj = 1 by the
first induction hypothesis, while if it belongs to paG(i) ∩ Ck, we have DjNj = 1 by the second
hypothesis, and consequently Dj,Nj−1 = 1 (because the event that Dj,Nj−1 = 0 and DjNj = 1
happens only if j defaults in a later round than all firms in Ck, which, however, is not possible
because j ∈ D1 ∪ . . .∪Dn−1 and i ∈ Dn). Therefore, we conclude that DiNi = 1, which ends the
proof of Di = DiNi for i ∈ Ck.
(2) If {ein : i ∈ [N ], n ∈ [Ni]} is a given sequence taking values 0 or 1, then, because of
(1), the probability that Din = ein for all i and n can only be larger than zero if ein ≤ ei,n+1 for
all i ∈ [N ] with Ni > 1 and n ∈ [Ni − 1]. In this case, we define for i ∈ [N ] the number
ni :=
{
min{n ∈ [Ni] : ein = 1} if eiNi = 1
Ni + 1 if eiNi = 0
and observe that Din = ein holds for all i ∈ [N ] and n ∈ [Ni] if and only if (with ei0 := 0 and
the abbreviation Li(T ) := er
′
0TFi +
∑N
j=1 erjiTLji − er0TKi)
• for all i ∈ [N ] with ni = 1 we have
Xi(T ) < Li(T )−
∑
j∈paG(i)∩ndG(i)
erijTLij1{ejNj=0},
• for all i ∈ [N ] with ni = Ni + 1 we have
Xi(T ) ≥ Li(T )−
∑
j∈paG(i)∩ndG(i)
erijTLij1{ejNj=0} −
∑
j∈paG(i)∩deG(i)
erijTLij1{ej,Ni−1=0},
• and for all i ∈ [N ] with 2 ≤ ni ≤ Ni we have
Xi(T ) < Li(T )−
∑
j∈paG(i)∩ndG(i)
erijTLij1{ejNj=0} −
∑
j∈paG(i)∩deG(i)
erijTLij1{ej,ni−1=0}
and
Xi(T ) ≥ Li(T )−
∑
j∈paG(i)∩ndG(i)
erijTLij1{ejNj=0} −
∑
j∈paG(i)∩deG(i)
erijTLij1{ej,ni−2=0}.
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Thus, using the independence of X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ) and their log-normal distribution, we obtain
on the one hand
P[Din = ein ∀i ∈ [N ], n ∈ [Ni]]
=
∏
i : ni=1
Φ(i, Σ¯mini , T )
∏
i : 2≤ni≤Ni
(Φ(i, Σ¯mini , T )− Φ(i, Σ¯mi,ni−1, T ))
×
∏
i : ni=Ni+1
(1− Φ(i, Σ¯mi,ni−1, T )), (.1)
where Σ¯min := {j ∈ paG(i) ∩ ndG(i) : ejNj = 0} ∪ {j ∈ paG(i) ∩ deG(i) : ej,n−1 = 0}.
On the other hand, if we assume for a moment that formula (3.13) is valid, we deduce that
for all i ∈ [N ] with ni = 1 we have
Ni∏
n=1
P[Din = ein | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)] = P[Di1 = 1 | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)]
= Φ(i, Σ¯mi1, T ),
that for all i ∈ [N ] with ni = Ni + 1 we have
Ni∏
n=1
P[Din = ein | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)] =
Ni∏
n=1
P[Din = 0 | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)]
= (1− Φ(i, Σ¯mi1, T ))
Ni∏
n=2
1− Φ(i, Σ¯min, T )
1− Φ(i, Σ¯mi,n−1, T )
= 1− Φ(i, Σ¯miNi , T ),
and that for all other i ∈ [N ] with 2 ≤ ni ≤ Ni we have
Ni∏
n=1
P[Din = ein | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)]
= P[Dini = 1 | paG¯(Dini) = paG¯(ein)]
ni−1∏
n=1
P[Din = 0 | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)]
=
Φ(i, Σ¯mini , T )− Φ(i, Σ¯mi,ni−1, T )
1− Φ(i, Σ¯mi,ni−1, T )
(1− Φ(i, Σ¯mi1, T ))
ni−1∏
n=2
1− Φ(i, Σ¯min, T )
1− Φ(i, Σ¯mi,n−1, T )
= Φ(i, Σ¯mini , T )− Φ(i, Σ¯mi,ni−1, T ).
Comparing with (.1), we conclude that
P[Din = ein ∀i ∈ [N ], n ∈ [Ni]] =
N∏
i=1
Ni∏
n=1
P[Din = ein | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)],
which proves that the random variables {Din : i ∈ [N ], n ∈ [Ni]} form a Bayesian network on G¯.
It remains to demonstrate the correctness of the conditional probabilities stated in (3.13).
We only carry out the proof for Ni > 1 and n > 1; the case n = 1 is simpler and can be achieved
by a straightforward modification of the following arguments. It is evident by the monotonicity
statement in (1) that ei,n−1 = 1 immediately implies
P[Din = 1 | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)] = 1,
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so only the case ei,n−1 = ei,n−2 = . . . = ei1 = 0 needs to be considered further. Conditional on
Di,n−1 = 0, we can now represent the parents of Din as
paG¯(Din) = Fn(Xj(T ) : j ∈ anG(i) \ {i})
with some function Fn whose explicit form can be derived from (3.10). Thus, abbreviating
Min := Li(T )−
∑
j∈paG(i)∩ndG(i)
erijTLij1{ejNj=0} −
∑
j∈paG(i)∩deG(i)
erijTLij1{ej,n−1=0},
we obtain
P[Din = 1 | paG¯(Din) = paG¯(ein)]
= P[Xi(T ) < Min | Xi(T ) ≥Mi,n−1, Fn(Xj(T ) : j ∈ anG(i) \ {i}) = paG¯(ein)]
= P[Xi(T ) < Min | Xi(T ) ≥Mi,n−1]
by the independence of X1(T ), . . . , XN (T ). This is exactly what formula (3.11) states. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.12. The proof is completely analogous to that of Theorem 3.10. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (1) We first assume that V1 and V2 are d-separated in G and
pick a chain between some (i1, Ni1) and (ik, Nik) with i1 ∈ V1 and ik ∈ V2. Observing that
(i, n) →G¯ (i′, n′) implies i = i′ or i →G i′, it follows that the chain under consideration cannot
be a path (otherwise also i1 and ik would be connected through a path in G, which contradicts
d-separation). It can neither be of the form
(i1, Ni1)←G¯ . . .←G¯ (ij , nj)→G¯ . . .→G¯ (ik, Nik)
as this would entail a chain in G of the same form, which would again violate the d-separation
assumption. As a result, the chain in G¯ must contain a type IV structure and is therefore blocked.
The other direction follows similarly, we omit the details.
(2) Every chain (i1, n1) 
G¯ . . . 
G¯ (ik, nk) with i1 ∈ V1 and ik ∈ V2 induces a chain
i1 
G . . .
G ik in G, where consecutive copies of a vertex are understood as merged to a single
vertex. By assumption, this chain in G must be blocked by V0 and therefore contain at least
one blocking structure of type I–IV. If a blocking structure of type I, II or III is present, say,
with middle vertex ij , then ij ∈ V0 and the corresponding sequence in the original chain in G¯
must contain a structure of the same type with some middle vertex (ij , n) and some n ∈ [Nij ],
hence blocking the chain in G¯. Similarly, for the last remaining case, if the chain in G has
a blocking structure of type IV, say, again with middle node ij , then V0 neither contains ij
nor any of its descendants. Since this immediately implies that {(i, n) : i ∈ V0, n ∈ [Ni]} and
{(i, n) : i = ij or i ∈ deG(ij), n ∈ [Ni]} are disjoint, and the original chain in G¯ necessarily
has a type IV structure with some middle vertex (ij , n) and some n ∈ [Nij ], it is blocked by
{(i, n) : i ∈ V0, n ∈ [Ni]}. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.4. (1) is obviously true. In (2) the statement for the absolute systemic
impact follows from the definition, while it follows from (4) for the relative systemic impact.
(3) is a well-known result, see Proposition 4.2 and the following remark in Levin et al. (2009).
Next, (4) is a consequence of an elementary inequality: If a/b and c/d are bounded by M , then
also (a+ c)/(b+ d). Therefore, the maximum in (4.4) is attained on J . Finally, for (5) we notice
that if I2 and J are d-separated in G given I1, then {(i,Ni) : i ∈ I2} and {(j,Nj) : j ∈ J} are
d-separated in G¯ given {(i, n) : i ∈ I1, n ∈ [Ni]}. Since observing SI1 = 0 means Sin = 0 for all
i ∈ I1 and n ∈ [Ni], the claim follows from the fact that d-separation entails independence in
Bayesian networks. 2
Contagion: A Bayesian network approach 24
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Rama Cont for enlightening discussions on systemic risk and to the Isaac
Newton Institute of the University of Cambridge for its hospitality.
References
D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi. Systemic risk and stability in financial net-
works. Am. Econ. Rev., 105(2):564–608, 2015.
V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen, T. Philippon, and M. Richardson. Measuring systemic risk. Rev.
Financ. Stud., 30(1):2–47, 2016.
T. Adrian and M.K. Brunnermeier. CoVaR. Am. Econ. Rev., 106(7):1705–1741, 2016.
F. Allen and D. Gale. Financial contagion. J. Polit. Econ., 108(1):1–33, 2000.
H. Amini, R. Cont, and A. Minca. Resilience to contagion in financial networks. Math. Financ.,
26(2):329–365, 2016.
K. Anand, B. Craig, and G. von Peter. Filling in the blanks: Network structure and interbank
contagion. Quant. Financ., 15(4):625–636, 2015.
S. Battiston, M. Puliga, R. Kaushik, P. Tasca, and G. Caldarelli. DebtRank: Too central to
fail? Financial networks, the FED and systemic risk. Sci. Rep., 2(541):1–6, 2012.
F. Biagini, J.-P. Fouque, M. Frittelli, and T. Meyer-Brandis. A unified approach to systemic
risk measures via acceptance sets. Preprint at arXiv:1503.06354 [q-fin.MF], 2015.
C. Brownlees and R.F. Engle. SRISK: A conditional capital shortfall measure of systemic risk.
Rev. Financ. Stud., 30(1):48–79, 2017.
F. Castiglionesi and M. Eboli. Liquidity flows in interbank networks. Preprint available at
https://sites.google.com/site/fabiocasti2310/research-1, 2015.
H. Chan and A. Darwiche. A distance measure for bounding probabilistic belief change. Int. J.
Approx. Reason., 38(2):149–174, 2005.
C. Chong and C. Klu¨ppelberg. Partial mean field limits in heterogeneous networks. Preprint at
arXiv:1507.01905 [math.PR], 2017.
R. Cont, A. Moussa, and E.B. Santos. Network structure and systemic risk in banking sys-
tems. In J.-P. Fouque and J.A. Langsam, editors, Handbook on Systemic Risk, pages 327–367.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.
B. Craig and G. von Peter. Interbank tiering and money center banks. J. Financ. Intermed.,
23(3):322–347, 2014.
N. Detering, T. Meyer-Brandis, K. Panagiotou, and D. Ritter. Managing systemic risk in finan-
cial networks. Preprint at arXiv:1610.09542 [q-fin.RM], 2017.
F.X. Diebold and K. Yilmaz. On the network topology of variance decompositions: Measuring
the connectedness of financial firms. J. Econom., 182(1):119–134, 2014.
Contagion: A Bayesian network approach 25
L. Eisenberg and T.H. Noe. Systemic risk in financial systems. Manag. Sci., 47(2):236–249,
2001.
M. Elliott, B. Golub, and M.O. Jackson. Financial networks and contagion. Am. Econ. Rev.,
104(10):3115–3153, 2014.
H. Elsinger, A. Lehar, and M. Summer. Risk assessment for banking systems. Manag. Sci., 52
(9):1301–1314, 2006.
Z. Feinstein, B. Rudloff, and S. Weber. Measures of systemic risk. Preprint at arXiv:1502.07961
[q-fin.RM], 2016.
J.-P. Fouque and L.-H. Sun. Systemic risk illustrated. In J.-P. Fouque and J.A. Langsam,
editors, Handbook on Systemic Risk, pages 444–452. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2013.
X. Freixas, B.M. Parigi, and J.-C. Rochet. Systemic risk, interbank relations, and liquidity
provision by the central bank. J. Money Credit Bank., 32(3):611–638, 2000.
P. Gai and S. Kapadia. Contagion in financial networks. Proc. R. Soc. A, 466(2120):2401–2423,
2010.
A. Gandy and L.A.M. Veraart. A Bayesian methodology for systemic risk assessment in financial
networks. Manag. Sci., 2016.
P. Glasserman and H.P. Young. How likely is contagion in financial networks? J. Bank. Financ.,
50:383–399, 2015.
C. Gourie´roux, J.-C. He´am, and A. Monfort. Bilateral exposures and systemic solvency risk.
Can. J. Econ., 45(4):1273–1309, 2012.
T.R. Hurd. Contagion! Systemic Risk in Financial Networks. Springer, Cham, Switzerland,
2016.
O. Kley, C. Klu¨ppelberg, and L. Reichel. Systemic risk through contagion in a core–periphery
structured banking network. In A. Palczewski and  L. Stettner, editors, Advances in Mathe-
matics of Finance, pages 133–149. Banach Center Publications, Warschau, 2015.
D. Koller and N. Friedman. Probabilistic Graphical Models. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
2009.
M. Kusnetsov and L.A.M. Veraart. Interbank clearing in financial networks with multiple ma-
turities. Preprint available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2854733, 2016.
S. Langfield, Z. Liu, and T. Ota. Mapping the UK interbank system. J. Bank. Financ., 45:
288–303, 2014.
S.L. Lauritzen. Graphical Models. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
D.A. Levin, Y. Peres, and E.L. Wilmer. Markov Chains and Mixing Times. American Mathe-
matical Society, Providence, RI, 2009.
C. Meek. Strong completeness and faithfulness in Bayesian networks. In P. Besnard, editor,
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference (1995), pages
411–418. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, 1995.
Contagion: A Bayesian network approach 26
C. Memmel, A. Sachs, and I. Stein. Contagion in the interbank market with stochastic loss
given default. Int. J. Cent. Bank., 8(3):177–206, 2012.
R.C. Merton. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. J. Financ.,
29(2):449–470, 1974.
K.P. Murphy. The Bayes Net Toolbox for Matlab. In E.J. Wegman, A. Braverman, A. Goodman,
and P. Smyth, editors, Computing Science and Statistics, volume 33, pages 331–350. Interface
Foundation of North America, Fairfax Station, VA, 2001.
J. Pearl. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco,
1988.
J.A. Pinto. Relevance based propagation in Bayesian networks. Master’s thesis, University of
California, 1986. Available at ftp://ftp.cs.ucla.edu/tech-report/198 -reports/860098.pdf.
L.C.G. Rogers and L.A.M. Veraart. Failure and rescue in an interbank network. Manag. Sci.,
59(4):882–898, 2013.
C. Upper. Simulation methods to assess the danger of contagion in interbank markets. J.
Financ. Stab., 7(3):111–125, 2011.
T. van Erven and P. Harremoe¨s. Re´nyi divergence and Kullback-Leibler divergence. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, 60(7):3797–3820, 2014.
